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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No: 05-3593
____________
CAROL C. WINTER,
Appellant
vs.
CYCAM/MED SOURCE TECHNOLOGIES
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-01699)
District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 11, 2006
BEFORE: FISHER, ALDISERT AND WEIS, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: January 17, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Carol Winter appeals pro se the District Court’s grant of
Cycam/MedSource’s (MedSource) motion for summary judgment on her complaint
alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§

12112, et. seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621,
et. seq., and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (sex discrimination). We will
affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts, thus, we will only briefly summarize
them here. MedSource hired Winter as a quality control visual inspector in August 2000.
She initially received positive employment evaluations, but beginning in August 2002,
Winter’s attendance dropped and the quality of her work deteriorated. In early 2003,
MedSource confronted Winter about her poor attendance and performance. She signed a
document acknowledging the warning, but never told her managers that she was suffering
from a disability. Her performance did not improve, leading to her termination on
February 27, 2003.
Winter filed a formal charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleging disability and age discrimination. After receiving a right to
sue letter, Winter filed the current action in District Court. She alleges that coworkers
subjected her to “intolerable” conversations regarding killing animals (Winter is a
vegetarian), and that they placed poison in the air conditioning system and her coffee.
She also makes general sex discrimination claims based on the lack of other women in the
company and a coworker’s comment comparing her to Linda Tripp when she reported the
conversations about killing animals to her supervisors. The District Court concluded that
Winter failed to assert a prima facie case on any of her claims and granted MedSource’s
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motion for summary judgment. Winter appealed.1
All of Winter’s claims are analyzed under the burden shifting framework
announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). In each
instance, Winter must first establish a prima facie case. Id. at 802. In the context of the
ADA, she must show that she “(1) has a ‘disability,’ (2) is a ‘qualified individual,’ and (3)
has suffered an adverse employment action because of that disability.” See Deane v.
Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). An individual is
disabled for the purposes of the ADA if she has “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A); see Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 401 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2005).
Not only does Winter fail to explain the precise nature of her disability, there is no
evidence to suggest that MedSource personnel knew that Winter was even injured to such
a degree that it affected the routine performance of her job. See Conneen v. MBNA Am.
Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 332 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, Winter fails to meet two of the three
elements of her prima facie case.
Her ADEA claim suffers similar infirmities. To establish a prima facie age
discrimination claim, Winter must show that “(1) s[]he is over forty, (2) is qualified for
the position in question, (3) suffered from an adverse employment decision, and (4) that
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the grant of a motion for summary judgment and apply the same test as the District
Court. See Wastak v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, 342 F.3d 281, 285 (3d Cir. 2003).
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. . . her replacement was sufficiently younger to permit a reasonable inference of age
discrimination.” Potence v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2004).
Winter provides no evidence that she was replaced by a substantially younger employee.
In fact, she admits to having no idea who was hired or transferred to take over her
position. Further, based on her performance evaluations, MedSource had a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for Winter’s termination.
Finally, Winter has failed to exhaust her claim of sex discrimination. In
order to bring a Title VII action in federal court, the plaintiff must first file a charge with
the EEOC sufficient to put the EEOC on notice of her particular claims. See Anjelino v.
N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 93 (3d Cir. 1999); Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018,
1020-21 (3d Cir. 1997). Although Winter properly filed a charge with the EEOC, she
makes no mention of sexual harassment. She does allege several incidents in her intake
questionnaire, but this is not sufficient to exhaust her claim. Winter filed her formal
charge after she filled out her intake questionnaire, implying that she abandoned those
claims in her formal complaint. See Bost v. Fed. Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1240-41
(11th Cir. 2004); Novitsky v. Am. Consulting Eng’rs, L.L.C., 196 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.
1999).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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